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ARGUl\1ENT 
The trial court incorrectly granted Mr. Lindsey's motion for summary judgment 
awarding him not only his premarital interest in the business, but also all of the 
$7,324,000 in appreciation of the business during the 19 year marriage. The trial court 
made this award in spite of Ms. Lindsey's contributions to the business and family life. 
Specifically, the trial court awarded Ms. Lindsey $566,527 in assets, while awarding Mr. 
Lindsey $10,524,138 million in assets. The trial court minimized and disregarded :Ms. 
Lindsey's efforts and contributions, misapplied the facts on summary judgment and at 
trial 1, depriving her of the interest she earned in the business during the marriage. 
Moreover, in spite of the requirement in any property division "that the ultimate 
division be equitable," Henshai.,v v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ,1s, Ms. Lindsey was 
awarded only 5.2% of value compared to Mr. Lindsey's $10,524,138 award. The trial 
court misapplied the facts to Utah law on equity, to Ms. Lindsey's prejudice. 
The arguments made in Mr. Lindsey's brief do not change the fact that the trial 
court incorrectly applied facts to Utah law, and failed to make an equitable division of 
1 The trial court found that "no new evidence \vas presented at trial warranting 
reconsideration of the summary judgment." [R.1782.] In other words, evidence presented 
at trial was considered and rejected by the trial court as impacting its ruling on summary 
judgment. This is consistent with Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure providing 
that "any order or other decision, however designated, that adjudicates fewer than all the 
claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties does not end the action as 
to any of the claims or parties, and may be changed at any time before the entry of 
judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties." Utah 
R. Civ. P. 54(b). As such, evidence at trial may be considered as part of the analysis as to 
whether the summary judgment ruling was correct. 
I 
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property. 
I. On summary judgment the trial court improperly denied M.s. Lindsey her 
interest in a portion of the appreciation of l\1r. Lindsey's business which she 
acquired through her contributions to the business and the family during the 
marriage. 
In his brief !\1r. Lindsey correctly notes that one spouse's separate property may be 
properly distributed to the other, if ·'the other spouse has by his or her efforts contributed 
to Lh.e enhancement, maintenance, or protection of that property, thereby acquiring an 
equitable interest." A1ortensen v .. ~1ortensen, 760 P.2d 304,308 (Utah 1988). However, 
the clarification of .i\1ortensen in Jensen is not as clear as Mr. LL.'t}dsey argues. 
Specifically, :Mr. Lindsey argues that "in order to qualify under the contribution category 
of Mortensen," "'active participation and contribution by the nonowner spouse" "is 
required." [Appellee's Brief at p. 19.] Ho\\rever, :Mr. Lindsey omits that this Court stated 
that "Af ortensen, Dunn, and Elman appear to require more active participation and 
contribution by the nonowner spouse [ than caring for the parties' child, maintaining the 
household, and running her ovm part-time business from their home as the facts in Jensen 
state] in order to qualify under the contribution theory of .~1 ortensen." Jensen v. Jensen, 
2009 UT App. 1 ~ ~ 14 (underline added). If the standard ,vere as clear as 1'1r. Lindsey 
argues, this Court would not have included the words "appear to" in its recitation and 
clarification of the law. 
This distinction is important because it reflects this Court's intentionally loose and 
flexible interpretation of the contribution theory given ho\\' liberal the standard was in the 
2 
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l 980s2 as compared to how the standard has morphed in more recent cases such as 
Jensen. In Jensen, the wife "did not assist in running the business or contribute in any 
way to its increase in equity," and ,vas not a,·varded an interest in the separate property. 
Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App. 1, ~ 16. However, in this case Ms. Lindsey contributed 
to the business ( as discussed in greater detail below) so she exceeds the wife's failure to 
contribute to the business "in any way" in Jensen. Similarly, Ms. Lindsey's efforts 
exceed the wife's efforts in Kunzler which were limited to "domestic labors enabl[ing] 
Husband to ranch for longer periods of time without having to, for example, return home 
to launder his clothes." Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ~19. 
As set forth in Ms. Lindsey's original brief, her actions and contributions fall 
somewhere between the extreme contribution case of Ebnan and the solely domestic 
contribution case of Kunzler. However, the trial court improperly minimized Ms. 
Lindsey's efforts and incorrectly applied the facts to Utah law on summary judgment and 
at trial. 
Mr. Lindsey also overreaches and misstates undisputed facts in his brief. For 
example, Mr. Lindsey claims Ms. Lindsey "admitted she had no involvement with [Mr. 
Lindsey's] insurance business prior to or during the marriage ... [ and that] she had no 
2 See, e.g., Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983) (holding that the trial 
court's property distribution-granting the wife forty percent of the value of the 
husband's company-was within its allotted discretion, in part, "while it is true that the 
[wife] took no responsibility for the business, it was her assumption of domestic burdens 
which made possible the [husband's] full-time participation in the business."). 
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knO\vledge of ... business operations ... [and that :Ms. Lindsey] admitted she ,,,as not 
involved in any business related discussions with [:Mr. Lindsey]." [Appellee's Brief at p. 
23.] Rather, the undisputed facts are that l\1s. Lindsey ,,,as inYolved in the business to the 
extent she hosted various business associates and clients~ and she "had little knowledge 
[but not "'no kno,·dedge''] of the operations of the business ... [ and] did not speak 
extensively [but she did speak] with :Mr. Lindsey regarding his businesses .... " [R.1224-
27.] !\1s. Lindsey was also involved in planning, building, and maintaining of the Heber 
residence (used to entertain business clients and associates) and involved in the 
acquisition of the helicopter (used for the business). [R.1881 :79-80, 1882:44-45.] 
More specifically ,vith respect to hosting business associates and clients, l\1r. 
Lindsey misstates the undisputed facts when he clain1S that Ms. Lindsey "ente1tained six 
of [:Mr. Lindsey's] business associates on seven occasions over the seventeen years .... " 
[Appellee's Brief at p. 23.] Rather, the undisputed and unrefuted facts are thaLMs. 
Lindsey claimed ··she entertained business associates, clients, potential employees, and 
potential clients during the ... maniage numerous times to further :Mr. Lindsey's 
business without being paid. She specifically testified [at the time of summary judgment] 
of hosting six different business associates and their families ... " [R.1226-27.] The 
unpaid hosting :Ms. Lindsey could recall included: 
1. Mr. Sheehey (from Lloyd's of London) visited nvice \\rith his family of five for 
extended periods. Each visit :Ms. Lindsey provided a hostess basket, maps, event 
4 
information, and clean sheets. The Sheeheys stayed at the Lindsey residence, as 
well as the business houseboat at Lake Po\\1ell. Ms. Lindsey cooked meals, 
cleaned up, and aided in laundry. \1/hen Mr. Lindsey was at work, Ms. Lindsey 
entertained the Sheehey family. Ms. Lindsey provided transportation to such 
events as a rodeo, concert, and sporting event. Mr. Sheehey also stayed at the 
parties' residence on a trip without his family on another occasion. [R.1226.] 
2. Charles Smith (from Lloyd's of London) "stayed numerous times at both the 
Draper and Heber houses." Ms. Lindsey often cooked for :Mr. Smith and did his 
laundry. Mr. Smith and his wife stayed at the Draper house and the parties took 
them skiing and Ms. Lindsey cooked for them. [R.1225-26 (emphasis added).] 
3. Paul Daley (from Lloyd's of London) and his family of five stayed and were 
hosted in the Heber residence. Mr. Lindsey ,:vas not even in town during the 
beginning of the visit. Ms. Lindsey provided hostess baskets, cooked numerous 
meals, cleaned up after them, and entertained them. Ms. Lindsey's car was loaned 
to the Dales for a week. [R.1225.] 
4. James (a river runner insurance client) stayed with his son at the Draper residence. 
Ms. Lindsey provided meals and other services to them. The same client was 
hosted another time (but not at the parties' residence). [R.1224-25.] 
5 
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5. J.T. Lemon (a river runner insurance client) v"as hosted on at least t\vo occasions, 
once at the Heber residence and another time at the Draper residence. !\1s. Lindsey 
also entertained him. [R.1224.] 
6. Frank Lukas (a river runner insurance client) was hosted at the Heber residence 
and :Ms. Lindsey entertained. [R.1224.] 
7. In addition~ at trial :Ms. Lindsey recollected that she had hosted Justin Tweety and 
he stayed at the parties' residence and she cleaned up after him and entertained 
him. [R.1881 :80-8 l .] 
Also at trial Ms. Lindsey's unrefuted testimony was that part of Mr. Lindsey's job 
\\1as to retain clients, and part of retaining clients is entertaining them, taking care of 
them, and making them happy. [R.1882:77.] Ms. Lindsey's unrefuted testimony ,·vas that 
she facilitated and participated in that process, but she was never paid. [R.1882:77-78.] 
The above is evidence Ms. Lindsey hosted, fed, entertained, and cleaned up after 
seven (not six) business associates/clients, plus their families (two \J;lith five family 
members). In addition, contrary to :Mr. Lindsey's claims of only hosting seven times, the 
undisputed facts are that the hosting occurred on "numerous" occasions, sometimes for 
extended periods of time. [R.1224-27.] For example, some stays were for 10 days and 
over holidays. [R.1882:91.] 
\Vhile Mr. Lindsey "stated that he alone \\70uld entertain clients at locations other 
than the marital residence and at his ranch in Uintah County," [R.1224], it is undisputed 
6 
and unrefuted that Ms. Lindsey also entertained outside of the home. For example, she 
hosted the Sheeheys in Lake Powell and at other events, like a rodeo, concert, and 
sporting event, outside of the home. She also went skiing with the Smiths away from the 
residence. [R.1225-26.] 
Ms. Lindsey's "numerous" hosting of various business clients and associates is 
evidence of providing services to the business without pay. :Mr. Lindsey tries to minimize 
her efforts, but the undisputed facts speak for themselves. The law does not require a 
non-owner spouse to be formally employed by the other spouse's business in order to 
prove the non-owner spouse has "augmented" or "enhanced" business interests. For 
example, the wife in Dunn performed unpaid services for the business but was found to 
have an interest in the business. Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P .2d 1314, 1318 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Mr. Lindsey argues there was no evidence Ms. Lindsey took on any "unusual" or 
extraordinary responsibilities in the marriage that enhanced the value of the parties' 
marital assets. However, during trial Mr. Lindsey testified regarding Ms. Lindsey's 
significant influence and contributions. In addition to hosting business associates and 
clients on "numerous" occasions, :Mr. Lindsey testified at trial3 that he and Ms. Lindsey 
were jointly involved in discussions and decisions related to acquiring the land and 
3 Again, the parties' trial testimony made after the summary judgment ruling are relevant 
to this appeal as the trial court found that "no new evidence was presented at trial 
warranting reconsideration of the summary judgment." [R.1782.] 
7 
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building the Heber residence. [R.1881:78-79.] :Mr. Lindsey testified that he preferred a 
different lot in \Vallsburg~ but Ms. Lindsey liked the Heber lot better. [R.1881 :79.] Mr. 
Lindsey testified that :Ms. Lindsey was involved in the construction process, she reYiewed 
building plans and made changes to them~ and they had ·'all kinds of discussions.~' 
[R.1881 :79-80.] The home took just under t\vo vears to build (this \\,as not the typical 
modest or uncomplicated residence-the home has thirteen air conditioners~ for 
example). [R.1881:80-81, 1223-24.] 
The parties spent nearly $7~000:000 to build the residence. [R.1881 :83 .] The home 
is large (15,000 square feet-5,000 square feet is the helicopter hangar and garage), and 
has a guest house, outdoor pool, game room, theater room, and many other rooms. 
[R.1881 :88-89.] Ms. Lindsey had complete control over designing and decorating the 
guest house (which, in addition to the main residence, was used to host and entertain 
business associates). [R.1882:115-16.] :Ms. Lindsey assisted in maintaining the property 
and made sure repairs were done and deliveries were made. [R. at 590-591, 1223-24.] 
Ms. Lindsey's assistance with the building, furnishing, and maintaining the home, \\'hich 
,.,vas used to host business associates and clients as ,vell as family, ,,,as ··unusual/' and 
contributed to enhancing, maintaining, and protecting the business and the maiital assets. 
Ms. Lindsey also contributed to the business and marriage in other \\1ays. !\1r. 
Lindsey conceded at trial that Ms. Lindsey accompanied him on business trips both 
domestic and international. [R.1881:97-100, 1816.] :Mr. Lindsey testified at tJ.ial that i\1s. 
8 
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Lindsey was involved in his helicopter acquisition, knew where :Mr. Lindsey went with 
regard to the helicopter and what he was doing, and supported him buying it. [R.1882 :44-
45.] The helicopter had a marketing contract with lv1r. Lindsey's premarital business. 
[R.1824; 1881 :62.] Ms. Lindsey also spent every other weekend for ten years at the 
parties' ranch while the ranch buildings and improvements were being made during the 
marriage. [R.1882:73; 1881 :61.] Mr. Lindsey testified that he used the family ranch to 
take business associates in the helicopter to fish or otherwise entertain. [R.18 81: 61-62.] 
Ms. Lindsey also testified she provided $54,000 of her separate money to iv1r. Lindsey for 
"his work" and "work related use." [R.1881 :75-76.] Ms. Lindsey's stated intent with the 
$54,000 was that it go towards the business, although at trial Mr. Lindsey claimed the 
$54,000 was used for marital expenses (he testified "I know that they were spent on 
marital expenses"), but shortly after he conceded there ,vas "no document or recollection 
or specific evidence" that led him "to know for any degree of surety" "what happened to 
the funds." [R.1882:249-50.] 
Ms. Lindsey also undertook "unusual" responsibilities in the family. Ms. 
Lindsey's unrefuted testimony was that she served Mr. Lindsey a home cooked meal 
every night that was waiting for him when he got home, and she had all of his clothes laid 
out every morning from the shirt to the socks. [R.1882:74.] She cared for the parties' son, 
was always his primary caregiver, attended parent teacher conferences and doctor's 
visits, did the laundry, assisted in student government campaigns, supported their son's 
9 
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religious choices, bought groceries, and so on. [R.1882:69-75.] She also cared for Mr. 
Lindsey's t\\'O children from his prior marriage~ ··loved them like [her] own/' and 
facilitated visitation every other weekend and every \Vednesday, and even allO\ved the 
children to live \";vith the parties full time \\'hen they were 16 years old and were having 
disputes ,;vith their mother. [R.1882:71-72.] :Ms. Lindsey provided unrefuted testimony 
that she provided "[e]very ounce of the parenting" for her son and !vfr. Lindsey's children 
from his prior man-iage, for all of the pai1ies' son's life and when :Mr. Lindsey's sons 
,·vere four and six and continuing until the children became adults. [R.1882:71-72.] 
Ms. Lindsey also supported ~1r. Lindsey during an extremely stressful time in his 
life when the Heber residence was being built and there was difficulty ''"ith financing the 
building of the home. [R.1881 :83-89.] ~1r. Lindsey testified at trial that due to the 
financing difficulties, his ··world ,vas falling apart" and caused :Mr. Lindsey "physical 
ailment.''4 [R.1881:88.] In fact, :Mr. Lindsey ,vas so emotional in recounting the event 
from years prior that the tiial court allowed a recess for him to "collect" himself. 
[R.1881 :87.] Ms. Lindsey supp011ed l\1r. Lindsey during this "unusual" time, ,vhich 
benefitted the business and the family. 
All of Ms. Lindsey's above "unusual" efforts augmented the value of the marital 
assets, and l\1r. Lindsey's business. She enabled him to spend time a,vay from home to 
4 :Mr. Lindsey's physical ailment was serious enough it was made part of the successful 
lawsuit against Countly'\vide. [R.1881 :88.] The la,vsuit resulted in a $1,038)25 judgment 
against Countr)'~Nide. [R.1776.] 
10 
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focus on business through her excellent homemaking. She entertained and hosted clients. 
She assisted in decisions regarding extremely expensive acquisitions such as the 
helicopter and Heber residence, both of which were used in part by the business. For 
perspective, Mr. Lindsey's entire income during the marriage was $11,749)97, and the 
parties spent $7,000,000 on building the residence. [R.1221, 1881 :83.] The residence was 
unusual, as were Ms. Lindsey's contributions. i\1s. Lindsey intended $54,000 of her 
separate money to go towards the business. She was the primary caregiver for the parties' 
son and Mr. Lindsey's two children from his previous marriage. And i\1s. Lindsey cared 
for Mr. Lindsey when his "world was falling apart" and suffering physically due to stress. 
Ms. Lindsey contributed to the business sufficient to satisfy the contribution theory as her 
actions show an "active participation with or contribution to" the gro\7\rth of Mr. 
Lindsey's business. Ms. Lindsey went to great lengths to enhance, maintain, and protect 
the business and the marital assets, many of which were intemvined (the business used 
and benefited from the parties' residence, ranch, and helicopter). Ms. Lindsey's actions 
entitle her to an equitable claim against a portion of the business, including appreciation. 
Summary judgment should be reversed. 
II. The trial court's ruling on summary judgment precluded an equitable 
division of the marital estate and misapplied legal precedent to the 
prejudice of lVIs. Lindsey. 
It is undisputed that in any property division, "[t]he overriding consideration is 
that the ultimate division be equitable-that property be fairly divided between the 
11 
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parties~ given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances at the time 
of the divorce." HenshaH-' v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ,I15 (emphasis added). [R. at 
1222.] It is also undisputed that '~[t]he court must consider whether there are any 
extraordinary circumstances that warrant a departure from the presumptive mle." Id. [R. 
at 1222.] 
Regardless of v,.rhether Ms. Lindsey met the contribution standard (which she did), 
the final balance of the property diYision (in a case '"rith no prenuptial agreement or 
similar contract protecting separate assets or corresponding appreciation) resulted in a 
drastic imbalance of equities. \"Vhile it is correct that a11 equitable distribution "does not 
need to be divided with strict mathematical equality," Christian v. Christian, 2014 UT 
App 283, ~12, 341 P.3d 254, the final distribution was not even close to mathematical 
equality. Ms. Lindsey was awarded only 5.2% of the value of:Mr. Lindsey's $10,524,138 
award. 
The trial court and :Mr. Lindsey focus on Elman for the position that a spouse 
should be entitled to a reasonable rate of return on a premarital business before 
quantifying or concluding that an increase in value during the maITiage is marital. 
Ho,vever, Elman does not require that in every case a party should have a return on a 
premarital asset, much less a 10% return. Rather~ this Cowi merely found based on the 
unique facts, that the trial court equitably subtracted a reasonable rate of return to 
12 
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appropriately account for appreciation due to inflation. Ebnan v. Elman, 2002 UT App 
83, ~~20, 29, 45 P.3d 176 . 
.An extension of the trial court's and 11r. Lindsey's overly broad logic would have 
this Court find that Elman requires a party with separate property to be entitled to no less 
than a 10% return before any consideration of equitable division of the asset. Notably, the 
10% rate in Elman was based on "[ e ]vidence ... presented that California real property 
values were increasing at 10% a year." Id. at ~34. Mr. Lindsey's logic places excessive 
weight on the fact that his business ,:vas his separate property originally, while it nearly 
quadrupled in value during the 19 year marriage. 
Mr. Lindsey's argument (i.e., that bis right for a return automatically trumps any 
of Ms. Lindsey's right to a return on the parties' largest asset) is not equity. While rate of 
return is one factor to be considered in balancing equity, it cannot be the only factor to 
consider. Mr. Lindsey argues that the Naranjo factors (i.e., the parties' health, their 
standard of living and respective financial conditions, their needs and earning capacities, 
the duration of the marriage, what the parties gave up by the marriage, and the 
relationship the property division has with the amount of alimony awarded) do not need 
to be considered. Naranjo v. Naranjo, 751 P.2d 1144, 1147-48 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The 
Naranjo factors are the type of factors that can infom1 the equities as to "whether there 
are any extraordinary circumstances that warrant a departure from the presumptive rule." 
Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56, ~15. 
13 
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Moreover and most importantly, all of the factors discussed in Section I above 
showing Ms. Lindsey contributed to the business~ also cut in favor of a more balanced 
division of property. l\1s. Lindsey's extraordinary contributions, as well as the 
extraordinary facts of the case~ justify the equity exception. 
Finally, under the equity exception, l\1r. Lindsey argues that :Ms. Lindsey's "small 
contributions, at best" would have done :Ms. Lindsey "no good in the end." [Appellee's 
Brief at p.30.] :Mr. Lindsey's labels of "small contributions" encompasses all the reasons 
discussed in Section 1 ~ as \,·ell as the $54,000 (wruch at the time of trial would have been 
worth $129,029 [R.1882: 186-87]) and the value of the 57 shares (,vhich issue was 
foreclosed at summary judgment [R.1229-30]). It is easy for :Mr. Lindsey to minimize 
Ms. Lindsey's financial and physical contributions to the business and marriage when he 
was awarded $ I 0~524~ 13 8 in assets. However, simply taking into account :Ms. Lindsey's 
$54,000 at the appreciated value would have increased the value of the assets awarded to 
her by over 20%. The trial court should have applied the equity exception in order to do 
justice. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, in light of the foregoing reasons and those contained in the Appellant's 
original brief, :Ms. Lindsey respectfully requests that the Court reverse the District 
Court's granting of summary judgment, find that l\1s. Lindsey is entitled to a portion of 
the augmentation of l\1r. Lindsey's business interest during the marriage, and remand to 
14 
the District Court for a new trial wherein the amount of the business Ms. Lindsey is 
awarded can be ascertained and where all other equities may be rebalanced in light of this 
Court's ruling. 
DATED this 16th day of May 2016. 
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DURH..4.M JONES & PINEGAR, P.C. 
Douglas B. Thayer 
Mark R. Nelson 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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